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i 
Abstract 
 
When entering the market, pharmaceutical firms face various regulatory factors that will 
influence the producer prices for their products. Price competition occurs when generic 
medicines enter the market. Previous studies of the pharmaceutical market have shown 
different regulatory means and their influence on producer prices and patient demand in the 
off-patent segment. More regulations are known to have a negative influence on price 
competition as well as they may attract less generics into the market. A lack of price 
competition is a problem among most countries. This thesis reviews key studies and 
introduces a theoretical model into the discussion. It applies price competition à la Bertrand to 
the Norwegian market for off-patent medicines. The research issue of this thesis is to analyze 
the effects on producer prices on drugs from introducing differentiated price caps and 
differentiated patient co-payment rates.  
 
 
Key words: Generic competition paradox, Generic medicines, Price caps, Price competition, 
Price regulations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
ii 
Acknowledgments 
This thesis was supported by a scholarship from HERO.  
 
In addition I would like to thank Professor Sverre Ole Grepperud, Institute of Health 
Management and Health Economics, who was supervisor for this thesis for his support and 
criticism on the way.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
iii
Abbreviations and Acronyms 
ATC Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical Classification System 
AIP Apotekenes innkjøpspris 
AUP Apotekenes utsalgspris 
CP Competitive Pressure 
e.g. for example 
FHI Folkehelseinstituttet 
GRP Generic Reference Pricing 
HOD Helse- og omsorgsdepartementet 
LMI Legemiddelindustriforeningen 
NIS National Insurance Scheme 
NOK Norwegian Krone 
NoMA Norwegian Medicines Agency 
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PC Price Cap 
PPP Pharmacy Purchasing Price 
PRP Pharmacy Retail Price 
p. page 
pp. pages 
RP Reference Price 
PPI Reference Price Index 
R+D Research and Development 
TRP Therapeutic Reference Pricing 
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iv 
Operational Definitions 
Avoidable Co-
payment 
An additional co-payment that is due to a drug price that is higher 
than the applying price cap. 
Brand Medicines Innovative medicine that was first on the market. 
Brand-Named 
Medicines 
See Brand Medicines. 
Competitive Pressure More competition makes it optimal for firms to reduce prices. 
Co-payment A patient’s financial share of the drug expenses which can vary from 
a fixed amount to a percentage amount. 
Generic (Competition) 
Paradox 
Suggests that brand-name prices increase simultaneously with the 
entry of generics after patent has been expired. 
Generic Medicines Chemically identical products with similar therapeutic benefits as 
the branded originator. Objectively perfectly substitutable goods. 
Generic Substitution Pharmacists are allowed to dispense a less expensive drug 
alternative than prescribed by physicians; this is often a generic. 
Monopoly Situation where one firm is the sole producer / supplier of a good; 
can be legally permitted by patent protection.  
Off-Patent Segment Pharmaceutical products that lost are not or no longer under patent 
protection. 
On-Patent Segment Pharmaceutical products that are under patent protection; regularly 
brand medicines. 
Originator See brand medicines. 
Patent Legal protection of an innovative product or ingredient that prohibits 
others to copy the innovation; restricted in time. 
Pharmaceutical 
Market 
On-patent segment and off-patent segment. 
Perfect Competition Situation where it is optimal to set producer prices equal to marginal 
costs of production. 
Preferred Product 
Scheme 
Requires any physician to prescribe a pre-defined first-choice 
product by law. The prescribing physician can only exculpate 
himself from this liability by stating medical reasons for not doing 
so 
Price Cap Pre-defined maximum reimbursable amount. 
Reference Pricing Similar beneficial drugs are compared systematically. Alternative 
drug treatments should be priced relatively equal to their therapeutic 
equivalences. 
Substitute See generic medicines. 
Vertical (Product) 
Differentiation 
Although almost perfect substitutes, brand medicines and generics 
are often seen as vertically differentiated goods with different 
product qualities.  
Vertical Integration Wholesalers own their own pharmacy chains which could determine 
the scope of distribution of pharmaceutical products. 
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1 
1 Introduction 
The determinants of pharmaceutical pricing strategies have received huge attention among 
policy makers. While the use of relatively less expensive generic medicines is believed to stir 
more competition within the pharmaceutical industry, innovative pharmaceutical firms need 
to differ in their pricing strategies to recover the industries typical high costs of research and 
development and prices are unlikely to converge towards the marginal costs of production. 
Most countries therefore guarantee new products a certain period under patent protection 
where competition is restricted because innovative manufacturers have a monopoly on their 
chemical entities and can charge high product prices to recover their research and 
development costs. This situation changes once patent protection has expired. Now the 
pressure through governments and other third-party payers increases to increase the use of 
generic medicines by generic substitution, preferred product schemes and tight reimbursement 
regulations. Reference-based pricing secures that similar beneficial drugs are compared 
systematically and alternative drug treatments should be priced relatively equal to their 
therapeutic equivalence. By definition and due to certain legal requirements branded 
originators and their generic copies are supposed to be almost perfectly substitutable goods 
and chemically identical products with similar therapeutic benefits [MERINO-CASTELLO 
2003]. Objectively rather homogeneous, brand-named medicines and generics are often 
perceived as vertically differentiated treatment options, typically on the demand side. 
Different policy reforms as well as different regulatory framework among countries suggest 
that competition is not yet completely utilized in this segment [KANAVOS et al. 2007]. Policy 
makers are still challenged by significant market shares for more expensive brand-named 
products after less expensive generics have been launched in the market. It shows that a 
success of generic medicines strongly depends on setting the right incentives for patients, 
pharmacists and prescribing physicians [JACOBZONE 2000, p. 42]. 
 
This thesis aims to address the cost reduction potential in off-patent drug markets for three 
reasons: First, in most countries drug expenditure is a significant percentage of overall health 
care spending. Second, there have been multiple reform proposals during the past. Third, 
those efforts have often failed in their wish to sustain cost containment and were therefore 
often displaced with the next reform.  
 
In detail, the paper analyzes the potential results of more differentiated policy instruments in 
the Norwegian off-patent segment. To the time this thesis is admitted, the current system is a 
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price cap system with common price caps as well as common patient co-payments for both 
brand and generic medicines. As a more theoretical example, this thesis approaches to control 
pharmaceutical expenditure and increase generic use by creating more cost-awareness on the 
demand side. Chapter 2 gives an overview of the Norwegian pharmaceutical market. In 
chapter 3, international experiences with off-patent regulations are summarized. The effects of 
regulatory policies in this field are discussed in chapter 4, while as the most determining 
variables of Norwegian regulatory means aiming to cost control off-patent medications, 
patient’s co-payments and price cap regulation are discussed in detail. Chapter 5 introduces a 
theoretical model into the discussion and applies price competition à la Bertrand to the 
Norwegian market for off-patent medicines. The model grows by implementing differentiated 
price caps and patient’s co-payments. Finally chapter 6 concludes by bringing together the 
theoretical approach and the performance and weakness of the current regulatory system  in 
Norway.  
 
This work mainly focuses on the producer price level. It aims to illustrate different aspects of 
pharmaceutical pricing in general and more specific for Norway. It strongly emphasis on the 
question: “Can we do any better?” and tries to answer this for the Norwegian market for off-
patent medicines. The research issue of this thesis is to analyze the effects on producer prices 
on drugs from introducing differentiated price caps and differentiated patient co-payment 
rates.  
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2 The Norwegian pharmaceutical market 
 
In this chapter I will give a brief overview of the Norwegian pharmaceutical market by 
describing the main actors and structures. The chapter will progress as follows: Section 2.1 
gives the legal framework, section 2.2 summarizes the key authorities, section 2.3 looks at the 
public funding and section 2.4 gives an overview of recent reforms in this segment. The last 
two subsections (section 2.5 and 2.6) discuss  supply and demand side characteristics 
respectively. 
 
2.1 Legislation and legal framework 
Although there are various specifications and adjustments, the two key legal Acts are the 
Norwegian Act on Pharmacies (Lov om apotek1) and the Norwegian Act on Medicinal 
Products (Lov om legemidler2).3 The Pharmacy Act was introduced on the 2nd of June in 2000 
and came to work nine months later on the 3rd of march in 2001 replacing the former 
Pharmacy Act of the year 1963. In this thesis, the Pharmacy Act of 2001 will be given most 
attention.  § 6 regulates sales and marketing issues for pharmacies where § 6-4 and § 6-6 
legally permit generic substitution in Norway. Pharmacists are now allowed to dispense a less 
expensive drug alternative than prescribed by physicians. Furthermore, pharmacists have to 
inform patients about the cheapest alternative drug available in the market. 
 
§ 6-4 Definition: 
In cases where more than one prescription drug exist that are equivalent in their 
health benefits, is the pharmacist in duty to inform the customer about the cheapest 
alternative. Equivalent prescription drugs are pharmaceuticals that that are 
substitutable after § 6-6. 
 
§ 6-6 Definition: 
Pharmaceuticals have to be dispensed precisely to the referring prescription and legal  
requirements. 
 
The pharmacy is allowed to substitute a prescribed drug with an equivalent generic or 
parallel imported pharmaceutical product that has been approved as substitutable for 
the prescribed drug. A substitution will be dismissed only and only if this substitution 
is not conform with the legal requirements or if the consumer explicitly wishes not to 
do so. 
                                                 
1  See the Norwegian definition <http://www.lovdata.no/all/hl-20000602-039.html>  (last accessed 26.12.2008).  
2  See the Norwegian definition <http://www.lovdata.no/all/hl-19921204-132.html>  (last accessed 26.12.2008). 
3  For more information see e.g. FJÆRTOFT (2003) who provides an extensive overview of the Norwegian 
Pharmacy Act in 2001, while KJOENNIKSEN’s et al. (2006) assesses the patient’s attitude towards the new policy. 
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The legislative institution can give further details in its regulations and may in 
particular cases make it necessary  to state the reason for a rejection of  the 
recommendation the pharmacy offered generic substitute if substitution is denied. 
 
With the dispense of a pharmaceutical in exchange for with the description, the 
pharmacy is obliged secure that customers are sufficiently well informed about the 
right use of the pharmaceuticals. 
 
2.2 Public authorities 
This section gives an overview of the four key public authorities (agencies) that are concerned 
with the provision of pharmaceutical drugs in Norway. These agencies are concerned with 
regulating the Norwegian pharmaceutical market. Their work concentrates on the three 
following core issues; (i) to regulate product prices and to keep patient - and public expenses 
at low levels, (ii) to secure equal access to pharmaceutical drugs, and (iii) provide drugs of a 
sufficient high quality by ensuring that certain legal requirements are fulfilled before they are 
launched into the market [DALEN 2003].  
 
Norwegian Parliament 
The Norwegian Parliament (Stortinget) is the highest legislative institution. Although the 
overall responsibility for health is given to the Norwegian Medicines Agency (NoMA), in a 
few cases the Parliament can decide on the resource allocation despite a recommendation of 
the NoMA. 
 
Norwegian Ministry of Health and Social Affairs 
The Norwegian Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (Helse- og omsorgsdepartementet, 
HOD) consists of seven departments and has the overall responsibility for the government 
policy on health and care services in Norway.  
 
Norwegian Medicines Agency 
The Norwegian Medicines Agency (NoMA, Statens Leggemiddelverk) is responsible to the 
Norwegian Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. It was formally founded in 2001 by the 
merging of prior administrative departments. Today the NoMA is concerned with the 
following tasks: 
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• new products’ market authorization,  
• ATC4 classification,  
• general pricing and reimbursement issues  
• as well as monitoring the market segment as a whole. 
 
Although the NoMA is in charge of the wholesale prices and retail margins, and controls the 
pharmacy purchasing price (PPP), like in many other countries, manufacturer prices are not 
subject to regulations in Norway. Wholesalers are free to price negotiate with manufacturers.  
 
Norwegian Institute of Public Health 
The Norwegian Institute of Public Health (Folkehelseinstituttet, FHI) mainly monitors the 
pharmaceutical consumption in Norway. 
 
2.3 Funding 
Norway’s public statutory health insurance system (National Insurance Scheme, NIS) is a tax 
based funding system that finances almost 70% of the total pharmaceutical consumption (see 
figure 2.1).The share of patients expenses in terms of co-payments amounts to only 6.8 % 
which is  much lower than in other countries (Figure 2.1). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1   Payment for Pharmaceutical Consumption in Norway. Source: LMI 2008. 
                                                 
4 The Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical Classification System (ATC) divides drugs into different groups 
according to the organ or system on which they act and/or their therapeutic and chemical characteristics. 
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Prescription medicines represent 88.4% of the total sales of medicines for 2006. There is a 
slight trend towards further expansion of the market growth of this sector during the last 
years. Prescription medicines grew at a rate of 1.3% in 2006. The public expenditure on 
medicines was 9.2% of the total public expenditure on health care in 2006 which is 
significantly lower than the OECD average being equal to 13.9% [LMI 2007] .  
 
Figure 2.2 shows that Norway’s public spending on reimbursable prescription medicines has 
steadily increased from 1997 but has declined from 2005 to 2007. The decline is believed to 
be a result of the new price regulation system combined with the patent expiry of several 
branded drugs in 2003 [LMI 2003 and 2008]. 
 
 
Figure 2.2   Public Spending on reimbursable prescription medicines. Numbers for 2007 and 2008 are 
estimated. Source: LMI 2008. 
 
2.4 Norwegian policy reforms 
There have been several price regulatory approaches (reforms) in Norway the last two 
decades all trying to curb public costs in the market for prescription medicines. In the period  
1993 – 2005, the following reforms were implemented: 
• National Reference pricing, 1993-2001 
• Standard Profit Margin Controls – AIP and AUP5, from 1995  
• International Reference Pricing and Generic Substitution of Drugs, 2001-2003 
• Index Price System, 2003-2005 
• Step-Price System and Preferred-Product-Scheme, from 2005  
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The reforms of generic substitution and preferred product scheme are both concerned with 
increasing cost awareness among physicians and pharmacies. Reference-,  index- and stepped 
pricing reforms on the other hand can be said to be mainly price reforms (see chapter 4). The 
step-price system, the index price system and the standard profit margins controls for 
pharmacies are described briefly in the following, as they are the three most recent reforms in 
Norway. 
 
Step-Price System 
Today’s regulatory system is a modified price cap (PC) system that applies international price 
levels (Reference Pricing, RP6). As a step-price system (Trinnprismodellen), the new 
regulatory approach was implemented in 2005 and reduces step wise the maximum 
reimbursable amount of pharmaceutical products that lost patent protection according to 
sales’ features as well as the establishment of generic competition. Starting out with 21 active 
chemical ingredients, the current system covers 45 substances.7  The actual percentage of the 
cut depends on the annual sales volume reached before. Modifications have been made, but 
the current system includes 2 steps. After a first cut of 30% the final step applies after six 
months and makes the cut from 30% to 55% or 75% depending on the sales volume.  A list of 
in the system included pharmaceutical products as well as their current prices is published by 
the Norwegian Medicines Agency. The stepped price is the maximum reimbursable price of 
the pharmaceuticals retail price (PRP) and it applies for reimbursable as well as non-
reimbursable drugs [NoMA 2008].  
Table 2.3   Step-Price System as from  01.01.2008. Source: NOMA (last accessed 26.12.2008). 
                                                                                                                                                        
5Apotekenes innkjøpspris (AIP) is the pharmacy’s purchase price,  Apotekenes utsalgspris (AUP) is the 
pharmacy’s selling price respectively. 
6 International Reference Price includes Sweden, Finland, Denmark, UK, Germany, Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, Ireland. 
7 An overview of the included substances  and their stepped price can be found under <http://www.legemiddelverket.no/ 
upload/75178/Oversikt%20over%20virkestoff%20i%20trinnprismodellen-på%20nett-2008-02-01%20revidert. 
xls> (last accessed 26.12.2008).  
Time when generic 
competition is established 
 
Pharmaceuticals with annual 
sales below 100 mill. NOK 
(AUP) 
Pharmaceuticals with 
annual 
sales above 100 mill. NOK 
(AUP) 
Immediately Prices are cut 30% Prices are cut 30% 
After 6 months Prices are cut 55% Prices are cut 75% 
After 12 months or later 
                               (optional) 
Prices are cut 65% when the 
annual turnover exceeds 15 mill. 
NOK (AUP). 
Prices are cut 80% when the 
annual turnover exceeds 30 
mill. NOK (AUP). 
Prices are cut 85% when the 
annual turnover exceeds 100 
mill. NOK (AUP). 
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By law, the pharmacies are obliged to offer at least one product out of each group, priced 
according to the applying stepped price, whereas the wholesalers are obliged to offer the 
pharmacies the appropriate products that enable them to fulfill these obligations. 
 
A preferred-product scheme was implemented in 2005. This system requires any physician to 
prescribe a pre-defined first-choice product by law. The prescribing physician can only 
exculpate himself from this liability by stating medical reasons for not doing so. The system 
aims to ensure the use of the most cost-effective medical treatment.  
 
Index Price System 
In March 2003 the “index-price” system was introduced in Norway.  Replacing former price 
caps with generic index pricing, this unique policy experiment [BREKKE et al. 2007; DALEN et 
al. 2006] covered six active chemical ingredients when implemented in 2003 and was 
restocked with the high cholesterol substance Simavastatin 15 months later.  In this price 
regulatory system, suddenly the pharmacies became the main target for policy makers to give 
strong financial incentives to promote generic use among consumers. Although generic 
substitution has been allowed in pharmacies since 2001, its impact was rather small than big. 
Since the second quarter of 2003, pharmacies were compensated with a pre-defined index-
price for the given active ingredients; no matter what the actual product supply to the patient 
has been. Incentive was given to supply cheaper substitutes than the received physicians’ 
prescription would name. Expected to trigger lower prices and to stir competition among 
firms operating in the market, the system was knocked-off by the Norwegian government by 
the end of 2004 when observed savings were argued not to be as significant as expected 
beforehand. Both BREKKE et al. (2007) and DALEN et al. (2006) strongly emphasize the lack 
of time under which this system unfolded. This meant that its impact on prices and cost 
savings was limited. Already evaluated after being just 11 months in practice and just 
covering a small sub sample of the whole Norwegian market for generics, BREKKE et al. 
(2007) claims that the governmental report was completed too early and that the system’s 
positive effects on pharmaceutical pricing would have naturally been prolonged in time. 
BREKKE et al. (2007) analyzes a larger dataset than the policy experiment would provide and 
includes off-patent drugs still under the normal price cap system. He argues that there have 
been indications that prices decreased after a while, although the effect was stronger on the 
branded originators than on the generic substitutes. A similar study of this time by DALEN et 
al. (2006) derive the same conclusion. They argue that index pricing succeeded in promoting 
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generic pharmaceuticals as well as in triggering price competition. Their results are based on 
periodical data before and after the systems’ introduction, monitoring the six origin 
substances covered by the index price regime and estimating the potential effects.  
 
Standard Profit Margin Controls – AIP and AUP 
Standard profit margin controls for pharmacies (Gevinnstdelingsmodellen) were implemented 
in Norway in 1995. This price control system aims to control the prices pharmacies purchase 
their product panel from wholesalers (Apotekenes innkjøpspris, AIP) as well as to control the 
consumer price paid by the patient when purchasing a product from the pharmacy 
(Apotekenes utsalgspris, AUP). Standard profit margin controls were meant to give financial 
incentive to pharmacies by allowing them to keep half of the profit margin that would occur when 
purchasing substances priced below the maximum AIP and selling them to the products’ 
AUP. But due to some dominating structural features within the Norwegian pharmaceutical 
market, this price regime did not show the desired effects. Vertical integration of wholesalers 
and pharmacies turned out to be a major problem. Vertical integration means that wholesalers 
own their own pharmacy chains (see section 2.5.2 for the wholesalers operating in Norway). 
In the absence of further regulations this could determine the distribution of pharmaceutical 
products. The wholesalers could provide only those drugs that seem most profitable to them. 
 
2.5 Supply side 
On the supply side we mainly find the pharmaceutical industry. International and national 
manufacturers, wholesalers, parallel importers and pharmacies that help supplying Norway 
with medicines. In the following I will exclude parallel importers from my below presentation 
since being less important for the research issue. 
 
2.5.1 International and national manufacturers 
Most international manufacturers are represented in Norway. National pharmaceutical firms 
mainly focus on the production of generic medicines [LMI 2008]. Figure 2.3 shows the 25 
leading pharmaceutical manufacturers in Norway by their market shares. 
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Figure 2.3   The top 25 pharmaceutical companies on the Norwegian market. Source: LMI 2008. 
 
2.5.2 Wholesalers 
Norway has three main wholesalers each owning their own pharmaceutical chains (vertical 
integration see section 2.4). With the Pharmacy Act in 2001, the independent pharmacies 
were in Norway replaced by pharmacy chains, controlled by the three wholesalers. As a 
result, Apokjeden Distribusjion AS (owned by Tamro OY/Phoenix group and with a market 
share of 33,5% in 2007), the Holtung AS (market share of 20%, owned by Alliance Unichem 
PLC) and NMD Grossisthandel AS  (owned by Celesio, 46,4%) controlled the Norwegian 
pharmaceutical market. 
 
Since there are no direct price regulations on manufacturers and due to the vertical integration 
of Norwegian pharmacies, much power is given to the wholesalers. They are permitted to 
bargain significant discounts and rebates with the producing manufacturers and consequently 
act as dispensation channel for the pharmacies. Pharmacists are restricted to have at least one 
generic substitute in their product portfolio. They decide on which portfolio they end up 
meaning that the wholesalers have much power. In general, wholesalers will prefer to buy 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
11 
from the manufacturers with the highest discounts (lowest prices), however these discounts 
need not be passed onto the affiliated pharmacies. In Norway, wholesalers have a major 
influence on the products being available in the market as well on their prices (pharmacy 
purchasing price, PPP).  
 
2.5.3 Pharmacies 
Figure 2.4 gives an overview of the main Norwegian pharmacy chains and their market 
shares. Pharmacies provide and dispense pharmaceuticals to the patient as consumer. Apotek 
1 AS is integrated into the Apokjeden Distribusjion AS. Vitusapotek AS and Ditt Apotek 
belong to the NMD Grossisthandel AS, while Alliance apoteken is owned by the Alliance 
Unichem AS.  
 
 
Figure 2.4   Pharmacy chain market shares in Norway. Source: LMI 2008 
 
Manufacturer prices are not directly regulated in Norway, instead pharmacies’ margins are a 
matter of governmental price regulation. Table 2.4 shows these margins. They are 8% for 
pharmaceuticals with a pharmacy purchasing price below 200 NOK and 5% for 
pharmaceuticals that exceed 200 NOK [NoMA 2008]. 
 
 
Table 2.4   Pharmacy margins in Norway8. Source: NOMA (last accessed 26.12.2008). 
 
                                                 
8 An additional fixed fee of 21.50 NOK per pack applies. Narcotic and psychotropic substances will be charged 
to an additional fee of 10 NOK per pack . 
 Pharmacy Purchasing Price 
(PPP) below 200 NOK 
 
Pharmacy Purchasing Price 
(PPP) above 200 NOK 
Maximum Pharmaceutical Retail 
Price (PRP) as maximum mark up 
percentage of the PPP 
 
8 % 
 
5% 
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2.6 Demand side  
This section provides an overview of the main market actors on the demand side – patients 
and prescribing physicians.  
 
2.6.1 Physicians 
In cases of prescription medicines the physician generally decides if and which 
pharmaceutical products will be prescribed to patients. Non-prescription medicines are 
generally chosen by the patient alone. Although a physician will significantly influence the 
drug demand by his prescribing practice (see informational asymmetries), he or she does not 
in general bear the financial consequences of his or her prescribing practice [see e.g. SCHERER 
2000].  
 
A preferred-product scheme was implemented in 2005. This system legally requires the 
physician to prescribe a pre-defined first-choice product. The prescribing physician can only 
exculpate him- or herself from this liability by stating medical reasons for not doing so. The 
system aims to ensure the use of the most cost-effective medical treatment.  
 
From early march 2008, physicians, pharmacists as well as patients have access to a more 
transparent information system in terms of comparing pharmaceutical products, prices and 
their substitutes. 
 
Informational asymmetries 
An important demand side limitation is informational asymmetries between patients and 
physicians. The physicians can, due to his informational advantages, influence the patient’s 
drug demand. He or she can for example influence the frequency of patient visits for example 
by the prescribed package-size [DANZON 1997a]. Physicians might have an incentive to abuse 
their position as patients’ best agents and trigger consumer demand that is not necessarily in 
the best interest of the patient. Patient might also think that high prices are a signal about high 
quality and for this reason prefer physicians that are prescribing the most costly medicines. 
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2.6.2 Patients  
Patients are often not able to evaluate the need for a pharmaceutical treatment and / or to asses 
which medication is most appropriate given her or his health needs. These decisions are 
typically delegated to prescribing physicians and dispensing pharmacies. As a result 
physicians as well as pharmacists can be said to act as the patient’s agents. 
 
In the current system patients’ pay themselves 36% of their medical expenses in terms of co-
payment, however this amount is limited by an annual ceiling of 1.615 NOK (January 2006). 
The annual ceiling on medication expenses was first introduced in the first half of the 1980s. 
The ceiling has been raised over time. According to an OECD survey, the ceiling of 2005 was 
reached by almost a quarter of Norwegians purchasing drugs. After reaching the annual 
ceiling, further medical expenses are fully born by the government (free drugs for patients) – 
the reimbursement 100%. In Norway, patient’s co-payment rates are not related to individual 
income. The relatively low annual ceiling is believed to be a result of significant distributive 
concerns. The official policy is that it is the need rather than income that should determine 
access to health care services and drugs [OECD 2005].  
 
Figure 2.5 illustrates the co-payment for prescription drugs in Norway. In the current system, 
there is a minimum flat fee per package of 21.50 NOK (lower ceiling) and the co-payment is 
limited to 1 650 NOK (upper ceiling).  Thus, no patient will pay less than NOK 21.50 and no 
one has to bear more than NOK 1615 of drug expenses per year or package respectively. The 
two horizontal lines within the figure represent this threshold. Children under the age of  
twelve and low-income pensioners are free from any co-payments. 
 
                     Co-payment in NOK 
   
         1 615  (upper ceiling) 
 
 
 
 
         21.50  (lower ceiling) 
    
                                                                                                        
                0                            Drug expenses in NOK (cumulated) 
Figure 2.5   Patient co-payment for prescription drugs in Norway (own figure). 
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Low price elasticity 
A second important demand side insufficiency is the lack of cost-awareness and low price 
elasticity of demand among patients. Subsidized and free drugs prevent patients from being 
confronted with the full costs of their consumption. The patient is not or only to a minor part 
involved; in form of co-payments. Under theory of full coverage insurance, the actual price of 
consuming a drug does not play a role for the patient at all. The patient’s marginal willingness 
to pay for his consumption is equal to zero and the resulting demand is absolutely price 
inelastic in this case. Any price increase would have no influence on the patient’s drug 
demand under full coverage insurance. Reducing the full coverage insurance to a scenario 
where the patient has to bear a certain part of his consumption, the resulting demand will be 
smaller than under full coverage. The patient’s demand becomes more price elastic and his 
marginal willingness to pay for a drug will be higher than the marginal willingness to pay 
under full coverage. However, any insurance coverage will result in a lower price awareness 
and a skewed demand. This insufficiency can lead to moral hazard with the incentive for the 
patient too many and / or unnecessary pharmaceuticals [DANZON and PAULY 2002]. 
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3 International experiences from generic medicine 
policies 
In this chapter I present a selective review of some empirical literature that studies the effects 
of regulatory policies on off-patent markets in other countries, analyzing the effects on prices 
mainly. There is not that much literature available for the Norwegian off-patent market. Two 
exceptions are BREKKE et al. (2006 and 2007) and DALEN and STRØM (2006) – both works 
focus mainly on the effects of reference pricing. However, since most countries regulate drug 
prices in one way or another, international regulatory experiences may help shed light onto 
the Norwegian off-patent market.  
 
3.1 DANZON and CHAO (2000) – Effects on price competition 
Price regulation is believed to have a major impact on pharmaceutical price setting.9 DANZON 
and CHAO (2000) observe price differences among seven countries and try to identify causal 
factors to these differences. They apply data from 1992 to analyze behavior in less regulated 
countries and more regulated countries. Their findings show that pharmaceutical products 
have lower prices in heavily regulated countries, while the market for generics is comparable 
small in these more regulated countries. Less regulated countries in contrast, are characterized 
by a strong competition for pharmaceutical products without patent protection whereas 
products still under patent protection are relatively high show comparable high prices. Here, 
competition pressure has led to comparable low prices for generics. Although it is assumed 
that pharmaceutical price differences between countries might be reduced, when considering 
the weighted mean (overall effect of countries with more and countries with less regulated 
markets and their drug prices), the link between regulatory system and pricing is argued to be 
significant. Regulations are seen to have an effect on prices.   
 
3.2 PAVCNIK (2002) – Effects of co-payment on prices 
The work by PAVCNIK investigates the relationship between the degree of patient-out-of 
pocket expenses and pharmaceutical prices in Germany. She finds that producers significantly 
change their prices when patient out-of-pocket expenses changes. Brand products in off-
patent markets that face more competition reduce their prices more compared to those with 
                                                 
9  See also BREKKE et al. (2007) and DANZON (1997b). 
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less competition. PAVCNIK studies the effects from a change in reimbursement on producer 
price levels. She used data from the period 1989 – 1996.   
 
3.3 DE WOLF (1988) – Effects of brand loyalty on competition 
Under patent protection, physicians are known to gain exclusive experience with the 
originator (brand) thus creating brand loyalty. For this reason physicians become more 
insensitive to generics which are launched into the market after patent expiry. Brand loyalty 
tends to “blind” physicians with respect to less costly substitutes to brand (originator). DE 
WOLF (1988) interviewed 200 prescribing physicians and observed that generic drugs were 
very badly represented in the preferred set of product names of physicians. He found that after 
generics have been launched into the Dutch market, physicians were more likely to stick with 
the branded products in their prescribing practice. The reason was that these drugs could build 
up a significant goodwill under patent protection and could gain from this brand loyalty even 
after the introduction of generics.  
 
3.4 The ‘generic competition paradox’  
After patent expiry and the entry of generic competitors in the market, the producer of brands 
might increase the price for its product instead of decreasing. SCHERER (1993) calls this 
phenomenon “generic competition paradox”. Actually there are two things that happen in 
response to the entrance of generics. First, the branded product increases or stay constant. 
Second, the branded product looses market share to the cheaper generics. In the following I 
will present empirical works that are  related to the ‘generic competition paradox’. 
 
VERNON and GRABOWSKI (1992 and 1996) 
VERNON and GRABOWSKI (1992 and 1996) examined 18 (22) branded drugs which faced 
generic competition in the period between 1983 – 1987 (1989 – 1993). They observed that 
none of the branded firms responded to the potential generic competitors for example by 
setting prices lower in order to scare them from entering the segment or at least to slow down 
their entry. In contrast, the prices of the brands steadily increased, both before and after the 
market entry of the generic competitors. While brand-named products increased prices, 
competition among generic copies led to falling prices of the generics relatively to the brands. 
This price effect was even stronger the higher the number of offered generics was. 
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FRANK and SALKEVER (1992 and 1997) 
FRANK and SALKEVER (1997) came to a similar conclusion when they examined 32 
pharmaceutical products that ran out of patent protection in the mid 80s. The prices of brands 
were observed to increase in response to the market entry of generic competitors. In an earlier 
paper they developed a theoretical model in order to explain the relationship between the 
price-setting behavior of producers of brands and the degree of market competition [FRANK 
and SALKEVER 1992]. They assumes a split of the market into two different segments. The 
first segment was a brand loyal consumer group, yielding a price inelastic demand for brands 
(brand loyal consumers). This consumer group could well be patients being covered by a 
health insurance scheme. The second group had a price elastic demand and could and this 
group could be hospitalized patients. For this group their pharmaceutical consumption is by 
hospitals having an incentive to reduce drug costs (hospitals budgets and profit maximization 
behavior). As long as there are no budget regulations for the prescribing physician, he or she 
might lack incentives to prescribe the cheapest drug available in the market. The physician 
may also have low incentive for gathering information on generics since in the collection of 
information is resource-demanding. 
 
BHATTACHARYA and VOGT (2003) 
Another study that tries to explain the mechanisms behind the generic competition paradox is 
BHATTACHARYA and VOGT (2003). Their empirical work does not split the market into two 
different segments, rather they focus on the importance of product publicity, recognition and  
information management. The demand for a pharmaceutical product will besides prices 
depend on its recognition among consumers. According to BHATTACHARYA and VOGT a firm 
will set a relatively low price when launching a new brand on the market. Such a policy may 
increase the product’s publicity when being new on the market, but in return will confront the 
firm with high expenditures for marketing and informing physicians etc. In total, the 
product’s price is low while marketing expenditures are high at the beginning. As soon as the 
product has reached a certain level of recognition (brand loyalty) in the market, prices are 
raised and the marketing effort slowed down. A significant brand loyalty might lead to brand 
loyalty and thus reduce the competitive pressure from generic competitors later on. The model 
analysis of BHATTACHARYA and VOGT’s showed no significant change in the prices of brands 
in response to the market entry of generics.  
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4 The determinants of drug pricing     
This chapter looks on the determinants of pharmaceutical pricing and their effects. Although 
this work mainly focuses on the off-patent market, section 4.1 roughly gives an overview on 
manufacturers’ pricing strategies by differentiating patent and post-patent period. Section 4.2 
discusses regulatory means that will be important for the theoretical model in chapter 5.  
 
4.1 Pricing strategies 
The price of a good is often the most important strategic decision variable10 of the 
pharmaceutical manufacturer. Different to other markets, prices are often less flexible due to 
regulatory policies. Figure 4.1 pictures the different periods during the life-cycle of a innovative 
pharmaceutical product.  
 
 Market-share 
                   Monopoly           Therapeutic competition      Patent expiry => price competition 
                                                   with patent protected 
                                                  “me-too” products 
        100%                                                                     
  
  (A)        (B)    (C) 
 
 
                                                                              
                                                                         20                                          Years 
Figure 4.1  Different periods during the life-cycle of a innovative pharmaceutical product. Source: 
BALLANCE et al. (1992), p. 207. 
 
Figure 4.1 distinguishes three different periods with different pricing strategies according to 
the life-cycle of a pharmaceutical product: monopoly (A), patent protection with “me-too” 
product competition (B), no patent protection (C). The vertical axis shows the resulting 
market shares for each of the periods while the horizontal axis shows the time frame. A 
monopolist will gain a absolute market share of 100% (A) until therapeutic equivalents with 
own patent protection are launched (B). The period under patent protection is commonly 
limited to 20 years. During patent protection (A and B), the manufacturer firm gains from a 
                                                 
10 See e.g. SØRGARD (1997), p. 64. In the model he uses, a product’s price is the key variable. Both competitors 
prices are defined as strategic complements. 
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temporary monopoly market position. The stage after patent protection (C) is characterized by 
a high potential for price competition since generic firms do not have to include resource 
intense research and development (R+D) expenditures into their cost calculations.  
 
The following sections will differentiate the problems related to competition before (A and B) 
and competition after patent expiry (C). 
 
4.1.1 Pricing and competition under patent protection 
On the supply side, patent protection guarantees the innovative firm that with market 
introduction of a new innovative product, there will be no product substitutes available due. 
Thus, patent protection guarantees the firm’s monopolistic position in the market for a certain 
time. The protected periods is currently 20 years in most countries. But patent protection only 
prevents from copying the same chemical formula. It is the exactly mix of chemical 
ingredients the patent is meant to protect, the particular therapeutic effect of the drug is not 
been covered. Thus, a certain degree of price competition will occur even under patent 
protection as soon as so-called “me-too” products are launched in the market. “Me-too” 
products are pharmaceutical products that are very similar in their structural composition, but 
differ to some extend in their chemical formulation from the innovation. LICHTENBERG and 
PHILIPSON (2002) for example argue that patents do prevent from competitors offering the 
very same product in the market, but do not succeed in preventing others launching products 
in the market that are slightly different in their composition and intend to treat the same 
symptoms and / or have the same health effects11. These products are mostly under patent 
protection themselves.  
 
However, unless there are imitators launched in the market, new innovative pharmaceutical 
firms are able to set high introductory prices which they can reduce over time if necessary. 
DEAN (1969) explains this initial monopoly position as skimming-strategy.  The demand for 
the innovator product becomes more price sensitive after new imitators enter the market. 
Thus, prices under patent protection slightly decrease over time according to DEAN (1969). 
Less innovative products and imitator goods in contrast are known to find a penetration 
                                                 
11 New pharmaceuticals are often not innovative. For example, LU and COMANOR (1998) find that from 148 
newly launched drugs under patent protection only 13 products were new innovations and missed a therapeutic 
substitute. 
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strategy with low launching prices more suitable to gain consumers. These drugs start with 
comparable low prices and increase their prices once they are settled in the market. 
 
4.1.2 Competition after patent expiry 
With the removal of the main entry barrier, new generic competitors enter the market after 
patent expiry. Competition for price and market share can occur from now on. Due to strict 
approval and security procedures, objectively the new generic competitors are perfect 
substitutes for the originator drug. Thus, not surprisingly, ‘the characteristics of the off-patent 
pharmaceutical market create a potential for price competition’ which ‘can be encouraged or 
stifled by regulations or other market interventions’ [MRAZEK and FRANK 2004, p. 245]. 
 
After patent expiry, generic copies are launched in the market. Thus, simultaneous 
competition between the originator product and its generic counterfeits arise as well as the 
different generic substitutes within one segment compete for market shares. 
 
Brand versus generic competition 
As drugs whose active chemical ingredients have lost their patent protection, the main 
characteristic of generics is that they are sold to relatively lower prices than the established 
brand-named goods. Although generics are almost perfect substitutes to the branded goods, 
they do vary in shape, color, packaging and their product names. The consumer therefore 
might not perceive the generic copy as perfectly substitutable for the branded drug. Hence, the 
price effects on brands from the entry of generics into the  market is not for certain. However, 
it is widely agreed consensus that brand prices maintain or increase after generic entry while 
losing market shares. CAVES et al. (1991) analyzes the effects on prices of the established 
brand-name product in the USA when generic pharmaceuticals are introduced. They studied 
30 drugs that lost their patents between the years 1976 and 1987 and estimated  a reduction of 
2% in brand prices after patent expiry. The entry of 20 generics competitors caused a decrease 
in prices of 17% for the originator products. CAVES et al. (1991) argue that these price 
decreases show a rather small price response to the entry of generic competitors in the 
market.12  
 
                                                 
12 Similar effects are observed by GRABOWSKI and VERNON (1992). It is argued throughout scholars that brand 
prices rather increase after entry of generics than they compete in prices. The so-called ‘generic-paradox’ 
suggests that brand-name prices increase simultaneously with the entry of generics after patent has been expired.  
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Generic versus generic competition 
There has not been yet been that much focus on the competition among generic 
pharmaceuticals themselves. Several empirical studies examined the relationship between the 
number of generic firms and their product prices and found a negative correlation [CAVES et 
al. (1991); FRANK and SALKEVER (1997); WIGGINS and MANESS (2004); REIFFEN and WARD 
(2005)]. REIFFEN and WARD (2005) find that the prices of generic products decrease with a 
growing number of producers of the same good, although prices maintained above the 
marginal cost of production and left enough space further generic firms to enter the segment.  
 
A recent study by SEELEY (2007) analyzes the determinants of generic versus generic 
competition in the market for Omeprazole and Paroxetine. Her findings suggest that also for 
generic-generic competition, low prices, as predicted under perfect competition, are crowded 
out by product differentiation and reimbursement schemes. Although almost perfect 
substitutes, brand-name pharmaceuticals and generics are often seen as vertically 
differentiated goods with different product qualities. In addition, SEELEY (2007) claims that 
patients do not always succeed in purchasing the cheapest generic drug available on the 
market. Vertically integrated structures between e.g. wholesaler and pharmacies as well as 
financial incentives of relatively big discounts may limit the product portfolio of pharmacies 
as mentioned in chapter 2. 
 
Branded generics 
Another argument for a comparable slow progress in generic price competition is argued to be 
a well developed branded-generic market. Originator firms find it often more profitable to 
maintain or even increase prices of their branded goods after patent expiry and fish for those 
consumers that are willing to pay a higher price still, while losing market shares to new 
generic competitors.  Although cheaper than the originator drug, branded-generics are often 
significantly more expensive than the unbranded counterpart [MRAZEK and FRANK 2004, p. 
247]. 
 
4.2 Regulatory policies 
Most countries justify the use of regulatory policies with the lack of competition. Monopoly 
power, informational asymmetries, morals hazard and the existence of insurance schemes 
make governments highly interested in controlling and containing their expenses. Although 
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countries vary in their mix of policy instruments, this section gives an overview of the main 
regulatory policy instruments that are currently determining the Norwegian off-patent 
pharmaceutical market. The chapter will divide supply side policies as reference pricing of 
pharmaceuticals (RP) is currently one of the most popular pricing instrument while fixed 
price cap (PC) systems present a comparable stricter policy instrument. On the demand side 
the influences of patient’s co-payment will be discussed. 
 
4.2.1 Optimal pricing  
This section introduces economic theory and determines optimal pricing.  
 
              Price                                              C´(x) 
   
      
       pm 
       p*  
                                                                P(x) 
 
                                         R’(x) = P(x) + P´(x)x  
                                                                                     Quantity 
                                       xm                
 
Figure 4.2 Monopoly pricing (m) in comparison to price setting under perfect competition (*). Source: 
Bester (2004). 
 
Figure 4.2 shows the different price settings under a monopoly and under perfect competition. 
A producer that enters the market in the absence of any competitor faces a monopoly (m) for 
his product. In this situation he can set the price for his product (pm) higher than the marginal 
costs of production represented by C´(x). P(x) is the function of the price while x denotes the 
quantity. The supplied quantity in a monopoly is xm. The monopolist’s profit results from the 
total revenue, which is price multiplied by quantity minus the costs; P(x)x – C(x). A profit 
maximizing monopolist will set the price pm to the point where the marginal revenue R’(x) 
equals the marginal costs C´(x). In figure 4.2 this is the point (pm ; xm). In a situation under 
perfect competition the optimal price p* would equal the marginal costs of production C’(x) 
instead. In figure 4.2 this would be the point where P(x) and C’(x) cross. Thus, the achieved 
price under a monopoly (pm) is higher than under perfect competition (p*) [see e.g BESTER 
2004]. 
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Due to the specific characteristics of the pharmaceutical industry, a policy that would per se 
allow only prices equal to marginal costs of production would strictly lead to negative returns 
for manufacturing firms. Short term marginal costs account only to 30% of total expenses, 
while costs for R+D are sunk global fix costs to the time a innovation is launched in the 
market [BREYER et al. (2005); SCHERER (2000)]. To cover the expenses for recourse intense 
research and development of pharmaceutical firms, prices have to be higher than marginal 
costs at least for a certain period. Figure 4.2 shows that therefore, under patent protection 
innovative firms can charge relatively higher monopoly prices (pm).  
 
However, even after patent expiry prices are observed less likely to converge towards the 
marginal costs of production and governments try to overcome these market insufficiencies 
by multiple regulatory instruments, on the supply as well as on the demand side.  
 
4.2.2 Supply side policy instruments 
This section discusses price cap regulation systems and reference pricing as two supply side 
policy instruments. Both policy instruments are chosen because they determine the current 
Norwegian regulatory framework for pharmaceutical pricing. 
 
4.2.2.1 Reference pricing 
Reference pricing means that similar beneficial drugs are compared systematically and 
Alternative drug treatments are priced relatively equal to their therapeutic equivalences. 
Reference pricing was first introduced in Germany in 1989, while different approaches were 
implemented in the Netherlands 1991, Sweden, Denmark and New Zealand 1993, Australia 
1996, Italy and Spain in 2000. Norway introduced international reference pricing in 2001 and 
the 2003 “index price system” was a pure reference price system.  
 
Reference pricing clusters pharmaceutical products with similar therapeutic effects into 
groups. These groups might not be equal among countries since they often differ in their 
definition of therapeutic equivalents. The decision to include or exclude on-patent drugs in the 
groups will determine the reference price. 
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Clustering 
The tightest way of drug grouping restricts the cluster to drugs with the same active chemical 
ingredients. Consequently, this approach does not include on-patent pharmaceuticals and will 
be defined as generic reference pricing (GRP) in the following. DANZON (2001) defines the 
extension of including other chemical ingredients but with similar therapeutic effects into the 
group as therapeutic reference pricing (TRP). According to DANZON (2001) the broader the 
group is defined the bigger is the cost saving potential, but the bigger are the therapeutic 
differences within the cluster. This trade-off imposes the risk to patients who swap to a 
cheaper drug which might not be the optimal treatment for them since therapeutic reference 
pricing imposes a variance in therapeutic effects as well as a variance of potential side effects. 
The bigger those therapeutic differences are, the more willing are patients to accept a higher 
price to trade-off potential risks that can arise when swapping from the as “reliable” 
experienced branded originator to a new and more risky generic substitute, although the later 
one is cheaper in price.  
 
The decision to include on-patent drugs into the therapeutic reference cluster, adds another 
trade-off to the controversy when following DANZON’s argumentation (DANZON 2001). 
Including on-patent pharmaceuticals will trade off the aim for cost control and the incentive 
for innovation and investment in research and development. A high reference price is a 
positive incentive for new innovations since it guarantees research and development intense 
firms to invest in the development of new drugs since they can offer their on-patent drugs to a 
comparable high price without exceeding the reference price or just slightly. On the other 
hand, there is no incentive for generic firms to offer their goods to a price below the reference 
price. Thus a relatively high therapeutic reference price significantly limits the generic 
competition.13 
 
4.2.2.2 Price cap regulations 
Price caps set a maximum reimbursement price to a specific pharmaceutical segment. The 
firm is free to charge a higher price, but this difference will result in patient’s additional co-
payment equal to the difference between price cap and manufacturer price. Compared to 
                                                 
13 BREKKE, STRAUME and KÖNIGBAUER (2005) address the same problem in their theoretical model. Their 
findings differ from the argumentation of DANZON (2001) and suggest that the price of each drug (on-patent 
brand, off-patent brand, generic) is highest under a system without reference pricing and lowest under 
therapeutic reference pricing (TRP).  
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reference pricing, price cap regulations occur to be more regulative. Price caps reduce prices 
according to a pre-defined cap, while reference pricing aims to create competition.  
 
Depending on the tightness of the regulatory framework, the price cap can be defined as the 
minimum price found within the cluster, the mean or median value. Stricter policies tend to 
favor the lowest price within one group to be defined as maximum reimbursable amount. 
Compared to other direct price regulatory means, under price cap regulations pharmaceutical 
manufacturer are free to set their prices higher than the price cap. Higher product prices will 
result in an additional patient co-payment since the patient has to bear the difference between 
the price cap and the higher manufacturer  price. 
 
Originally, price cap regulation policies were introduced on the telecommunication sector in 
Britain. British Telecom introduced this policy scheme in 1983. The regulation with a upper 
price limitation was supposed to replace the missing competition and to give incentives to the 
firms to obtain similar gains in efficiency as under perfect competition. 14  As a retail price 
index (RPI) regulation system, price capping is argued to be a relatively strict policy 
instrument.  
 
Figure 4.3 shows that prices might converge towards a common price cap.  
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Figure 4.3  Generic and brand pricing under a common price cap (own figure). 
 
                                                 
14 See BERNSTEIN (2000). 
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Figure 4.3 distinguishes competition above and below the price cap when there is one 
common price cap for generics and brands. The drug price up to the amount of the price cap 
will be reimbursed by the insurance coverage. Prices above the price cap will result in 
additional co-payments equal to the exceeding amount for the patient. An opportunistic firm 
will rather increase the price to the price cap as this amount is the maximum reimbursable 
price in any case.  
 
Competition above the price cap 
Above the price cap, the brand will move prices towards the price cap or slightly above to 
avoid an additional co-payment for the patient. Thus, price competition might occur, but is 
limited in the potential amount of decrease since an opportunistic firm will not decrease prices 
lower than the cap. 
 
Pharmaceutical products that had a higher price before the introduction of a price cap system 
and the involved maximum reimbursable amount, are left with two possibilities according to 
STARGARDT et al. (2005): To leave the product price above the price cap and to accept a 
decrease in their sales quantity or to reduce their prices to the price cap level and accept a 
decrease in their sales volume due to lower prices. Firms that choose the first alternative have 
to hold certain advantages over those firms that set their prices equal or below the price cap 
and thus avoid additional patient’s co-payments. The main determinant here is the perceived 
utility of the pharmaceutical products by the prescribing physician and the patient as 
consumer.15 
 
Competition below the price cap 
Below the price cap, the generic competitors might not compete in prices at all. It seems more 
reasonable for them to simply converge towards the price cap. The space for price 
competition below the price cap might be at least limited or even not-existent. In addition, 
generic medicines might in fact be too expensive under this regulation. This might especially 
be the case when the same price caps are applied for branded as well as generic goods.  
 
                                                 
15 ZWEIFEL and CRIVELLI (1996) see the physician’s role as the patient's agent as influential. They might 
describe a relatively more expensive drug which if priced above the reference price diminish the patient’s overall 
drug consumption when they believe in the superiority of the brand-named product through prescribing praxis 
and experience for example. 
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Some countries are observed to apply additional cuts to the prices to not only maintain public 
costs but also reduce them. Figure 4.4 shows the Norwegian step-price system where the first 
price cap is due to reference pricing and the step wise following cuts are reducing the price cap further 
according to annual sales volume and generic competition (see section 2.4). Figure 4.4 is similar to 
figure 4.3 and differs only in the circumstance that the maximum reimbursable amount (price 
cap) is reduced over time. The aimed for effect are reduced prices by making patients more 
cost aware if prices do not naturally decrease over time. 
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Figure 4.4  The Norwegian step-price as strict price cap system (own figure). 
 
Different price caps 
A tight policy instrument such as fixed price cuts is seen as a rather short-lived decrease of 
pharmaceutical expenditure [see MOSSIALOS et al 2004, p. 10]. On the other hand, setting 
maximum reimbursement price levels that will be paid by the government,  create more cost 
awareness on the demand side since every cost above this pre-defined price cap has to be 
borne by the patient.  
 
While Figure 4.3 suggests that patient’s cost-awareness as pro-competitive determinant might 
be crowded out by a common price cap, differentiated price caps for brand-name 
pharmaceuticals and their generic copies could be able to exploit this potential more 
sufficient. Figure 4.5 shows a scenario with different price caps for generics and brands. 
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Figure 4.5  Generic and brand pricing under different price caps (own figure).  
 
In figure 4.5 generic and brand medicines have different price caps. PCB is the price cap for 
brands and PCG is the price cap for generics. Again, prices above the price cap for the product 
will result in additional co-payments equal to the exceeding amount for the patient. For a 
generic medicine the patient will face an extra co-payment when the price is above PCG and 
for a brand when the price exceeds PCB respectively. If there are sufficient enough generic 
substitutes on the market16, there will be at least some generics that converge towards the 
lower generic price cap (PCG) of figure 4.5. If so, this lower price cap on the one hand 
guarantees that generic products are relatively fair priced and are less likely to be over-priced 
as under a common price cap. In addition, consumers might be more price sensitive towards 
the whole segment if and only if generic prices converge towards the pre-defined price cap for 
generics. Opportunistic behavior drives the prices still towards the price cap, but the gap 
between both price caps creates more cost-awareness. 
 
4.2.3 Demand side policy instruments 
Cost awareness on the demand side builds a solid base for regulatory approaches to the 
patients’ and the physicians’ financial incentives to increase generic product usage. This 
section looks on the effects of patient’s co-payments since there are no budget limitations for 
physicians in Norway.  
                                                 
16 To the entry of generic see e.g., SCOTT-MORTON (1999) who observes that this is not a random decision. Firms 
are likely to launch an own generic into the market when this drug fits into their existing portfolio and / or the 
consumer groups intersect. 
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Co-payments 
Co-payments are the patient’s financial share of the drug expenses. An insured patient 
effectively pays the price that is equal to his or her co-payment for a pharmaceutical product. 
Co-payments can vary from a fixed amount to a percentage amount of the expenses. 
According to ZWEIFEL et al. (2005), a positive  patient’s share is crucial for cost awareness, 
although the actual high depends on individual risks and preferences.17   
 
Whether co-payments come as fixed deductibles per package or as percentage share of the 
retail price depends on the regulatory framework. A study by NEWHOUSE (1993) found that a 
co-payment of 25% reduces the demand of 25% while the demand would decrease with 43% 
nearly half when patients would have to pay 95% of the drug expenses. A fixed deductible per 
package will result in a more efficient demand for the amount of drugs and prevents from 
overconsumption. However, in cases where the price is higher than the deductible, the patient 
lacks a financial incentive to search for the cheapest alternative. Percentage shares on the 
other hand lead to more cost-awareness on the demand side. The higher the patient’s share is 
the more price sensitive is his or her demand. A share of 100% is equal to the case of no 
insurance coverage, while the absence of any co-payment means total coverage by the insurer.  
DANZON (1997) argues that a percentage share is more effective than a fixed deductible.  
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   co-payment x                                                                           co-payment x                
                                                        p = x                                                                          p = x 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                                         25% 
                                                                                                                                                     10% 
 
       drug  price p                                                                           drug  price p 
 
Figure 4.6 The patient’s co-payment as a function of prices in dependence from the price (According 
to NEWHOUSE (1993)).  
 
                                                 
17 To the features of the optimal insurance contract and moral hazard, see ZWEIFEL and MANNING (2000), 
CUTLER and ZECKHAUSER (2000) and PAULY (2000).  
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Figure 4.6 shows the patient’s co-payment as a function of prices in dependence from the 
price for the two alternatives: fixed share and percentage share. The vertical axis illustrates 
the amount of co-payment (x) paid by the patient and the horizontal axis illustrates the actual 
price of the drug (p). In the absence of insurance the patient would be reliable for the total 
price of the drug,  the co-payment would be 100%. This is illustrated by the 45º axis where 
the co-payment euqals the drug price, p = x for any given price. From figure 4.6 it can be 
observed that under a fixed deductible the co-payment is equal for all products. When the 
price is higher than the deductible, patients have no incentive to search for the cheapest 
alternative. A percentage share instead links the co-payment directly to the price of the drug. 
The higher this percentage is, the more price sensitive the patient’s choice will be. A 
percentage co-payment of 25% will make the patient more cost aware than a co-payment of 
10%.  
 
Drug Formularies 
Drug formularies are positive or negative lists for reimbursement which either include 
(positive list) or exclude (negative list) pharmaceuticals from reimbursement. To influence the 
physician’s prescribing practice, many countries have implemented so called drug 
formularies. In order to lower costs, these lists contain drugs which have been approved for to 
be or be not reimbursed. Positive lists limit the choice of pharmaceutical products to the ones 
that are listed. Negative lists excludes certain drugs from the reimbursement scheme. Norway 
has a positive list for drug reimbursement. 
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5 The model 
In this chapter I will analyze the effects on producer prices from introducing differentiating 
price caps and differentiated patient co-payment rates. Price caps as well as co-payment rates 
are two of several policy instruments a regulator may apply to affect the price-setting 
behavior of pharmaceutical companies. Price caps together with patients’ co-payments have 
effects on the degree of reimbursement that occur for drugs.  
 
In this section I will present and analyze a theoretical model. The model will be presented 
under three different contexts. First, the model is analyzed when assuming that the price caps 
for brands and generics and the co-payment rates brands and generics are the same (identical 
price caps and co-payment rates). Second, the same model is presented but now for different 
price caps for the branded good and the generic (differentiated price caps). Third, the model is 
analyzed for different co-payment rates for the brand and the generics (differentiated co-
payment rates). Finally, the results from the three analysis are compared.  
 
The comparison is done from the manufacturer’s point of view in the sense that I will try and 
identify under which scenario the competitive pressure is highest. The intention is to find out 
whether differentiated price caps and co-payment rates may lead to more competitive pressure 
relatively to a situation with identical price caps and co-payment rates.   
 
I will apply a model of Bertrand price competition model for differentiated goods to analyze 
the above research questions. This model assumes two firms (oligopolistic) and simultaneous 
price setting behaviour [see SØRGARD 1997].18 After patent expiry the branded drug producer 
faces a new market situation for which the producer not any more can charge its monopoly 
prices any more.  The brand producer will now face competition from the producers of 
generics. According to SØRGARD (1997), horizontal product differentiation will be found 
when products are not fully substitutable. Consequently, a product perceived as being of 
higher quality for example will be priced higher than its lower quality rival, even if it is only a 
perceived quality differentiation. 
 
Using the Bertrand Price competition model for differentiated goods for pharmaceutical 
products can be justified if not all consumers purchase the good with the lowest price [see 
                                                 
18 The model is based on SØRGARD (1997), pp. 61 – 64. 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
32 
MERINO-CASTELLO (2000); PAVCNIK (2002); GRABOWSKI and VERNON (1992)]. Thus, the 
branded good and and the generics are are perceived by patients as being being different for 
identical prices meaning that they are not perfect substitutes.   
 
5.1 Benchmark: common price caps and rates of co-payment      
We consider a situation where there exist two alternative drugs to cure a specific illness. Firm 
B (brand) is the innovating firm that originally launched the drug but has recently lost its 
patent for this product. A second firm, firm G (generic), has launched its own product, a 
generic copy of firm B’s product. The products are chemically the same but consumers do not 
perceive them as perfect substitutes. If  both products have the same consumer price, the 
patient is assumed to stringently prefer the branded good to the generic one. θ is the patient’s 
preference, θB > θG. 
                                                                                                                         
In the benchmark scenario, both products (B and G) are subject to a common price cap 
regulation 
−
p as well as a common co-payment α.  
 
The total demand for each drug, Qi (I = B,G) are: 
                                                                                      cons        cons 
QB    =  θB –  bpB + kpB                                              (5.1) 
                              
                                                                                      cons       cons 
QG   =  θG – bpG + kpB                                               (5.2) 
 
Qi denotes the total demand for each drug. This demand results from the consumer’s 
preference θi for each drug minus the consumer price pi
cons
, plus the consumer price of the 
competitor pj
cons. b and k are constants. It is assumed that 0 < k < b. The change of the own 
producer price has a stronger effect on the firm’s sale than a change of the competitors  
price.19 If  both products have the same consumer price, the patient is assumed to stringently 
prefer the branded (B) good to the generic one (G) while θ is the patient’s preference. It is 
observed from (5.1) and (5.2) that if both consumer-prices are equal to zero then GGQ θ=  and 
BBQ θ= . In the following it will be assumed that GB θθ > , meaning that the demand for B is 
strictly higher than for G given zero prices. This follows because we study vertically 
differentiated goods where the branded product in average is assumed to be valued more by 
                                                 
19 See SØRGARD p. 61. 
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the patients than the generic one. Thus, the patient perceives the two goods as being of 
different quality for example because of imperfect information and brand loyalty.  
 
The actual consumer prices, pi
cons  for the two drugs can be expressed as follows:  
                                                                                                              
                                           α
−
p                                    for   prodip   < 
−
p  
                                           pi
cons   =                                                                                          (5.3) 
                                                                        α
−
p  + [ prodip  –
−
p ]            for    prodip  > 
−
p  
 
where i = B, G.  
                                                                                                                                                     
α ε (0,1) is the co-payment rate, prodip is the producer drug price and 
−
p is the price cap. To 
simplify my forthcoming analysis we assume that prodip p> . This is done in order to avoid 
taking  the discontinuity present in (5.3) into account when deriving equilibria. It follows 
from (5.3) that the co-payment rate represents a fixed share (in percent) of the price cap. It is 
also observed that  the amount paid by consumers depends on two factors. First, they pay a 
share of the price cap. Second, they pay the full difference between the producer price and the 
price cap – meaning that the patients in need of drugs fully have to bear the amount exceeding 
the price cap.. A producer price, prodip , equal to the price cap, p , gives low  patient expenses, 
now, all patients payments follow because of the share paid of the price cap.  
 
The demand functions can be expressed the following way by inserting (5.3) into (5.1) and 
(5.2): 
                                                                                              
QB  =  θB - b(α p  + [pB
prod – p ]) + k(α p  + [pG
prod – p ] )                                (5.4) 
                                                        
                   QG  =  θG - b(α p  + [pG
prod – p ]) + k(α p  + [pB
prod – p ] )                                (5.5)  
 
The objective of  the two firms are to maximize profits. The profit functions are as follows: 
                                                                                                           
πB   =   (pB
prod
 – c) QB                                                                                                 (5.6) 
                                                                                
πG   =   (pG
prod
 – c) QG                                                                                                (5.7) 
 
where c is the marginal production costs. It follows from (5.6) – (5.7) that c is constant and 
the same for both firms.   
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The governments’ total expenses, PE, are: 
                                                                            
  PEi = ∑ p (1 – α) Qi                                                (5.8) 
 
It follows from (5.8) that all expenses not paid by the patient are covered by the third-party 
payer (government).  Public expenses are equal to the fraction of the price cap not covered by 
the patient multiplied to the number of drug units sold.  
 
Bertrand equilibrium of the game 
First, I will derive the equilibrium for the benchmark case where both price caps and patients’ 
co-payments rates are the same for the brand and the generic (homogeneous).  
 
The first-order-conditions are derived by maximizing the profit functions of the two producers 
with respect to their respective producer prices:  
                                                               
        Max πB  = (pB
prod – c) [θB - b(α p  + [pB
prod – p ]) + k(αp + [pG
prod – p ] )]                 (5.9) 
             pB 
                                    
        Max πG  = (pG
prod – c) [θG - b(α p  + [pG
prod – p ]) + k(α p  + [pB
prod – p ] )]            (5.10) 
            pG 
 
The first-order-condition (FOC) are as follows, where each condition also is rearranged in 
order to present the reaction functions (the second-order-conditions (SOC) are assumed to be 
fulfilled): 
 
                 _                       prod   prod                          prod          _                     prod    
∂πB  = θB–p(α–1)(b-k)-2bpB+kpG+bc  =  0   ==>   pB  =  θB–p(α–1)(b-k)+kpG+bc   ≡  RB(PG)        
∂pB                                                              2b 
(5.11)            
                                  
                 _                       prod    prod                                   prod          _                     prod 
∂πG  = θG–p(α–1)(b-k)-2bpG+kpB+bc  =  0   ==>   pG  =  θG–p(α–1)(b-k)+kpB+bc   ≡  RB(PG)           
∂pG                                                                 2b 
(5.12) 
Expressions (5.11) and (5.12) balance marginal benefits with marginal costs, and it presents  
the optimal price level of firm i as function of the competitor’s price level (reaction 
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functions). The reaction functions describe how the optimal choice of price level depends on 
the price level chosen by the rival.  
 
The Bertrand equilibrium is derived by solving the firms reaction functions simultaneously. 
An equilibrium is characterized by that no firm wants to change its price level when 
observing the choice of its competitor as concerning price level. Substituting (5.11) into 
(5.12) and vice-versa yields the following equilibrium price levels: 
 
                              prod                 _                                         _ 
p*B = 2b(θB – p(α–1)(b-k) + bc) + k(θG – p(α–1)(b-k) + bc) 
 (2b+k)(2b-k)                                                       (5.13) 
and 
                             prod                  _                                         _ 
p*G = 2b(θG – p(α–1)(b-k) + bc) + k(θB – p(α–1)(b-k) + bc) 
 (2b+k)(2b-k)                                                       (5.14) 
 
 
From (5.13) and (5.14) I can see that in equilibrium the two price levels differ only because of 
the demand side valuation of the drugs (θi) differ. We have already assumed that 0 < θG < θB, 
hence in the benchmark case, firm B will always sets a higher equilibrium producer price than 
firm G: 
                                                                  prod             prod 
p*B   >   p*G                                                        (5.15) 
 
 
By rearranging (5.13) and (5.14) I get the following expressions:   
 
                      prod_c                          _                                  _ 
                     p*B =     c  +  2b(θB – p(α–1)(b-k)) + k(θG – p(α–1)(b-k)) 
  b(2b + k)                                                          (5.16) 
and 
                      prod_c                         _                                 _                                    prod_c 
                     p*G =    c  +  2b(θG – p(α–1)(b-k)) + k(θB – p(α–1)(b-k))          <    p*B   
b(2b + k)                                                        (5.17) 
 
 
From (5.16) and (5.17) I can see that both equilibrium prices are strictly higher than the 
marginal costs of production, c. This conclusion derives from the second term on the right 
hand side being strictly positive. This conclusion is standard in Bertrand models with two 
differentiated goods. Economic theory predicts that in the case of differentiated products 
equilibrium prices will exceed marginal costs and that the deviation will increase as products 
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become increasingly differentiated. Although the brand and the generics are homogeneous in 
their chemical formulation, patients are assumed to perceive them as being vertically 
differentiated, e.g. due to certain quality believes.  
 
Substituting (5.13) into (5.4) and (5.14) into (5.5), the equilibrium quantities are as follows: 
 
                                 _                            _                                   _                 
Q*B    =  θB – (k-b) [p(α–1)  +  2b(θB–p(α–1)(b-k)+bc)+k(θG–p(α–1)(b-k) + bc)]             (5.18) 
                                                                     (2b+k)(2b-k) 
 
                                 _                            _                                    _                 
Q*G    =  θG – (k-b) [p(α–1)  +  2b(θG–p(α–1)(b-k)+bc)+k(θB–p(α–1)(b-k) + bc)]             (5.19) 
                                                                    (2b+k)(2b-k) 
 
 
By subtracting the (5.19) from (5.18), I obtain: 
 
Q*B  - Q*G    =  θB–θG - (k-b)[2b(θB–θG)+k(θG–θB)]   >   0        ==>     Q*B  > Q*G           (5.20) 
         (2b+k)(2b-k) 
 
 
From (5.20) I can observe that in the equilibrium the demand for B is higher than the demand 
for G, although (5.15) suggests that in the equilibrium, firm B can set a higher producer price. 
Subtracting the equilibrium demands, I find that the outcome is strictly positive. In the 
benchmark equilibrium the demand is higher for the branded drug. 
 
Substituting (5.18) and (5.19) into (5.8), yields the following expression for public expenses 
evaluated in the equilibrium: 
 
                _                                       _                          _                                    _ 
PE*B =  p(1- α)(θB-(b-k)[p(α–1)  +  2b(θB–p(α–1)(b-k)+bc)+k(θG–p(α–1)(b-k) + bc)])                         
                                                                                     (2b+k)(2b-k)                                   (5.21)        
            _                          _                          _                                    _ 
PE*G = p(1- α)(θG–(b-k)[p(α–1)  +  2b(θG–p(α–1)(b-k)+bc)+k(θB–p(α–1)(b-k) + bc)])                       
                                                                                      (2b+k)(2b-k)                                  (5.22) 
 
 
To sum up, I have shown that given common price caps and co-payment rates, firm B charges 
a higher producer price than firm G. This again means that the consumer price is highest for 
the branded product. Furthermore, the demand, and thus the market share, is highest for firm 
B. This conclusion follows due to the difference in patient valuation of the two goods – 
despite a higher consumer price for B patients demand B relatively more than G.  
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In the following I will investigate what the effects on equilibrium producer prices are from 
changes in two policy instruments (co-payment rates and price caps). In addition, the effect 
from a change in the valuation parameter will be investigated.  
 
The effect from a change in co-payment follows by differentiating pi with respect to α, which 
yields: 
                                                           _              _ 
∂ pi
prod  =   2bp(k-b) – kp(b-k)      <   0                                           (5.23) 
                                  ∂ α                 (2b+k)(2b-k) 
 
From (5.23) I find a negative relationship between the producer price and the co-payment 
rate. This finding can be interpreted as being the result of increased demand side cost 
awareness. The higher the co-payment, the higher the consumer price for a given producer 
price. Shifting a higher cost burden onto the patient causes a more price-sensitive demand 
function. The extreme case where the co-payment rate is equal to 1 equals a situation without 
any insurance, while an co-payment rate equal to 0 means full insurance coverage. It becomes 
optimal for the firm to lower their producer prices when the co-payment rate is higher. An 
increased co-payment makes the patient’s demand more price sensitive and he or she might 
react with a lower consumption.  
 
The effect from a change in the price cap follows by differentiating pi
prod with respect to p , 
which yields: 
 
                             ∂ pi
prod  = 2b(α–1)(k-b) - k(α–1)(b-k)           > 0                                    (5.24)                            
                           ∂ p                      (2b+k)(2b-k) 
 
From (5.24) I find a positive relationship between the price cap and the producer price. It 
follows from (5.24) that the higher the price cap, the more profitable the firm finds it to set a 
high producer price. The patient has to bear a compulsory share of the price cap in form of 
α p in any case. Thus, opportunistic pharmaceutical firms are likely to converge towards the 
price cap. A higher price allows the firms to set higher prices without or only slightly 
exceeding the cap. This in return prevents the patient from facing an additional but avoidable 
co-payment. On the other hand a higher price cap will increase the co-payments since the co-
payment is a fraction of the price cap. Higher co-payments could make it for the producer 
more optimal to lower the price. However, under a given price cap there is no incentive to 
lower prices below the price cap since patients will always have to bear the same fraction of 
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the price cap. Comparable high price caps seem less likely to stir cost awareness on the 
demand side. 
 
The effect from a change in the patients’ perceived valuation of the two goods follows from 
the two following expressions:   
 
∂ pi
prod   =   ____2b____      > 0                                      (5.25) 
                                                ∂ θi             (2b+k)(2b-k) 
 
∂ pi
prod   =   ____k____        > 0                                      (5.26) 
                                                ∂ θj            (2b+k)(2b-k) 
 
It follows from the two above expressions (5.25) and (5.26) that the relationship between 
consumer valuation and producer price is positive. A higher valuation of both goods means 
that the manufacturers set higher prices. This conclusion  follows because  a higher valuation 
is implying that consumers are willing to pay more for both goods. It is also observed  that the 
effect under (5.25) is stronger than the effect under (5.26) since  0 < k < b. Hence, the patients 
valuation of the own product i has a stronger influence on the price than the valuation of the 
counterpart j. 
 
In the benchmark case, I find that with a common price cap and a common co-payment for 
brand-name as well as for generic goods, prices are higher than the marginal costs of 
production and are unequal in the equilibrium. The brand-name good has a higher producer 
price in the equilibrium than the generic good. With a similarity of the price regulatory 
policies for both goods, the incentive for pharmaceutical firms to price compete seems to be 
very limited. The dominant factor is the perceived difference in quality. Therefore, 
pharmaceutical firms producing generic substitutes cannot take advantage of their lower cost 
structures to attract more patients in this setting.  
 
5.2 Differentiated price caps.  
Now I will introduce differentiated price caps into the model in order to study the effects on 
demand and equilibrium prices.  
 
The following assumption is imposed:                         
                                                             _        _ 
                                                            pB  >  pG                                                                    (5.27) 
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saying that each good has a price cap and that the price cap for the brand, Bp , is strictly 
higher than the price cap for the generics, Gp . 
 
Following the same procedures as in the benchmark case, the price-level in equilibrium 
becomes: 
                                                           _                      _                                                       _                       _ 
p*B =  2b[θB – pB(α-1)b+pG(α-1)k+bc]  +  k[θG – pG(α-1)b+pB(α-1)k+bc]           (5.28) 
(2b+k)(2b-k) 
 
     _               _                                    _               _ 
p*G =  2b[θG – pG(α-1)b+pB(α-1)k+bc]  +  k[θB – pB(α-1)b+pG(α-1)k+bc]           (5.29) 
 (2b+k)(2b-k) 
 
Subtracting (5.28) from (5.29) yields the following expression:   
                                                                            _   _ 
p*B - p*G =  (2b-k)(θB–θG) + (2b+k)(b+k)(1-α)(pB-pG)  > 0        ==>      p*B  >  p*G         (5.30) 
                                         (2b+k)(2b-k) 
 
It follows from (5.30) that the equilibrium price for the brand is strictly higher than the 
equilibrium price for the generics. This conclusion  also mattered for the benchmark model. 
 
Subtracting the two equilibrium quantities yields:   
                                           _   _         _    _                                                                     _    _ 
Q*B–Q*G = θB–θG+(b+k)[(pB-pG)+α(pG-pB)+(-b-k)[(2b-k)(θB–θG)+(2b+k)(b+k)(1-α)(pB-pG)]        
                                                                                                  (2b+k)(2b-k) 
 
  Q*B – Q*G > 0      ==>        Q*B > Q*G                                        (5.31) 
 
From (5.31) it is observed that even for small ∆θ = θB – θG, the expression stays positive. In 
the equilibrium, the demand is highest for the brand. Brand loyalty might be stronger than the 
financial incentive of a lower price cap for generics. 
 
I now want to study the  relationship  between the equilibrium producer prices and the price 
cap levels. This is done be differentiating (5.28) and (5.29) with respect to the price caps: 
 
∂ pi
prod     =    (2b²- k²)(1- α)      >     0                                                     (5.33) 
                                                _ 
                          ∂ pi                 (2b+k)(2b-k)   
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                          ∂ pi
prod    =      kb (α -1)             <     0                                                     (5.34) 
                                               _ 
                          ∂ pj                (2b+k)(2b-k) 
 
 
with i;j  = B;G and i≠j. 
 
From the two above expressions, I find that the equilibrium price of each good  increases in 
response to a higher price cap for its own good (see 5.33). Whereas there is a negative 
relationship between the equilibrium price of own good and the price cap of the rival (see 
5.34). A lower price cap for the generic will lead to a  higher equilibrium price for the brand. 
This finding follows because an increase in the rival’s price cap makes the rivals good more 
expensive for consumers and more demand will be directed towards other firms supplying 
them with power to raise there prices somewhat.    
 
Under differentiated price caps, I find that the brand-name good has still a higher producer 
price in the equilibrium than the generic good. The dominant factor is still the perceived 
difference in quality.  
 
5.3 Differentiated  co-payments rates.  
Now I will introduce differentiated rates of co-payment into the model in order to study the 
effects on demand and equilibrium prices.  
                                       
The following assumption is imposed:        
                                                                       
                                                    αB  >  αG                                                          (5.35) 
 
saying that each good has a co-payment rate and that the co-payment for the brand, αB, is 
strictly higher than the co-payment for the generic, αG. 
 
Following the same procedures as in the benchmark case, the price-level in equilibrium 
becomes: 
                                        _                                                 _      
p*B = 2b[θB-p([αB-1]b-[αG–1]k)+bc] + k[θG-p([αG-1]b-[αB–1]k)+bc]             (5.36) 
 (2b+k)(2b-k) 
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                                         _                                                 _            
p*G = 2b[θG-p([αG-1]b-[αB–1]k)+bc] + k[θB-p([αB-1]b-[αG–1]k)+bc]            (5.37)  
 (2b+k)(2b-k)   
 
                                                           
 
Taking the difference between  (5.37) and (5.36) yields:  
                                                                                      _                           _ 
p*B  -  p*G  =  (2b-k)(θB-θG) + 2b(b+k)(αG-αB)p + k(b+k)(αB-αG)p              > / <       0 
                                                    (2b+k)(2b-k)                                                
 
p*B  >  p*G       or       p*B  <  p*G                                                    (5.38) 
 
From (5.38) I find that  the equilibrium price of the generic is no longer strictly lower than the 
equilibrium price of the brand. This is because the second term in the numerator of (5.38)  is 
negative. The expression (5.38) can become positive or negative. This depends on the 
difference between the consumer valuation of both goods, θB-θG and the difference between 
the co-payments, αG-αB. The closer the drug valuations and the bigger the difference between 
the co-payments, the more likely it will be that in the equilibrium the producer price of the 
generic is higher than the producer price for the brand. Firm G faces a lower cost burden for 
the patient, 0 < αG < αB < 1, and can take advantage of a certain price scope of demand. For 
the very same producer price, the patient would have to pay less for generics. Firm G can 
exploit this advantage. As long as the price paid by the patient for the generic is smaller to the 
price paid for a brand, a price sensitive patient might demand the generic. 
 
A numerical example shows that even with a relatively higher producer price, firm G can still 
offer its product to a less expensive consumer price than firm B. I denote a common price cap 
−
p  = 6 and the following differential co-payments, αB = 0.4  and αG = 0.32. The actual 
consumer price when both firms price their products according to the price cap are 2.4 for the 
brand and 1.92 for the generic. By exceeding the price cap slightly with a new producer price 
of 6.3, firm G can now charge a higher producer price than firm B. Although patients buying 
product G are charged an avoidable co-payment equal to the amount that exceeds the price 
cap (0.3). The consumer price of G is still lower than the price paid for B:       
                                                                                                       
                             pG
cons
   =   α
−
p  + [pG
cons – 
−
p ]   =   0.32 * 6 + 0.3   =   2.32                   (5.39) 
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Especially after modifying or changing a regulatory system, firms might utilize this price 
scope. For the patient the consumer price of generic medicines paid under a common price 
cap practically does not change, only the reasoning for the consumer price changes.   
 
Subtracting the two equilibrium quantities yields:  
 
                Q*B - Q*G   =  θB-θG – b(αB-αG) 
−
p  + k(αG-αB)
−
p  + (-b-k)(p*B - p*G)      > / <    0 
 
                                        Q*B > Q*G   or   Q*B < Q*G                                                (5.40) 
 
 
From (5.40) I find that in the equilibrium, under differentiated co-payments the demand for 
generics can exceed the demand for brand-named goods. This is because the found expression 
can become positive or negative. The expression becomes negative if and only if the 
perceived valuation ∆θ = θB-θG is sufficiently small enough and the co-payments αB and αG 
are different enough so that ∆α = αB-αG is big, meaning that the demand is generics is higher 
than the demand for the brand. The more substitutable the goods are perceived, thus ∆θ is 
very small, the more effective are differential co-payments in increasing to shift the demand 
to relatively lower priced generics.  
 
As done before, I now want to study the  relationship  between the equilibrium producer 
prices and the co-payment levels. This is done be differentiating (5.36) and (5.37) with 
respect to the co-payments: 
 
                                                                          _ 
∂ pi   =     (k² - 2pb²)_    < 0                                                  (5.40) 
                                           ∂ αi        (2b+k)(2b-k) 
 
                                                                                                    _ 
∂ pi   =     (kpb - 2bk)     > 0                                                  (5.41) 
                                           ∂αj         (2b+k)(2b-k) 
 
 
From the above expressions, I find that the equilibrium price of each good decreases in 
response to a higher co-payment for its own good (see 5.40)  whereas there is a positive 
relationship between the equilibrium price of the own good and the co-payment of the rival 
(see 5.41). A lower co-payment for the generic will lead to a  lower equilibrium price for the 
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brand. This finding follows because an decrease in the rival’s co-payment makes the rivals 
good cheaper for consumers and more demand will be directed towards this product.  
 
Under differentiated co-payments I find that the in the equilibrium the producer price as well 
as the demand for the brand can be higher or smaller than the producer price and demand for 
the generic. With differentiated co-payments for both goods, the incentive for pharmaceutical 
firms to price compete seems more relevant than under the benchmark scenario. The 
dominant factor is no longer the perceived difference in quality alone. Higher cost-awareness 
becomes gains more importance. 
 
 
5.4 Comparing the three scenarios 
After identifying the the equilibrium prices in all three scenarios, I would now like to  
compare all three scenarios according to their level of profits for firm B which has been the 
former monopoly manufacturer. I do this to find out under which scenario producer prices are 
closest to the marginal costs of production in the equilibrium. I assume that the closer the 
producer price is to the marginal costs of production, the more effective the regulatory means 
have been.  
 
Traditional market oriented models using Cournot or Bertrand competition, show that the 
entry and availability of new alternatives to a certain product will result in price competition 
and in the decrease of  prices of the brand [see BOONE et al. (2007)]. WIGGINS and MANESS 
(2004) for example show in their study of anti-infectives that prices of the branded drug fall 
with the entry of generic competitors. Even more, prices decrease inverse in relation to the 
number of sellers.  
 
Competitive pressure 
Competitive pressure (CP) means a situation when a firm finds it more optimal to reduces 
prices as the competition increases. As seen in figure 4.2, in a situation under perfect 
competition the optimal producer price equals the marginal costs of production. High 
competition will reduce the  profit of all firms in the market. In the following I will 
investigate what happens with the profit of producer B in the three scenarios. The intention is 
to identify in which scenario the competitive pressure is highest and thus the profit is lowest. 
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In the situation where the producer price equals the marginal costs of production, the profit of 
firm B would be zero. I  denote competitive pressure as CP, the steepness of the firm’s profit 
function is denoted by ∂π/∂c20. The steeper the profit function, the less profitable is this profit 
function for the firm. In the following, the definition of competitive pressure is geared to my 
subject: price competition. I will use competitive pressure as the steepness of the profit 
function of firm B under the three previously derived scenarios, CPi = ∂π/∂c. CPi  (i = 1, 2, 3) 
refers to the scenario, as CP1 is the competitive pressure found for the benchmark case and so 
on. I chose to analyze the competitive pressure for firm B, producing the brand, since I 
assume that the situation from monopoly to competition changes producer prices most. I aim 
to find the scenario where firm B’s profit function is steepest meaning that this profit function 
is least profitable to firm B but closest to the optimal producer price under perfect competition 
respectively, which is the marginal cost of production c. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                             
Deriving the firm’s profit function with respect to its cost level for the benchmark scenario, I 
obtain:                                                     _               _          _               _ 
∂πB =(pB
prod
–c)[θB-b(αp+[pB
prod–p])+k(αp+[pG
prod–p] )]  = 0 
                           ∂c 
           _              _         _               _ 
=>            CP1 = b(αp+[pB
prod–p])-k(αp+[pG
prod–p])-θB                                                         (52) 
 
 
For scenario two and under differential price caps, I find: 
 
                                                                                                 _                   _            _                  _               
            ∂πB=( pB
prod
 –c)[θB-b(αpB+[ pB
prod –pB])+k(αpG+[ pG
prod –pG])] = 0 
                            ∂c 
                                              _                  _           _                  _ 
=>             CP2 = b(αpB+ [pB
prod –pB])-k(αpG+[ pG
prod –pG])-θB                                              (53) 
 
 
For scenario three and under differentiated co-payments, I find: 
 
                ∂πB =( pB
prod
 –c)[θB-b(αB
−
p +[ pB
prod
 –
−
p ])+k(αG
−
p +[ pG
prod
 –
−
p ] )] = 0 
                            ∂c 
 
=>             CP3 =  b(αB
−
p +[ pB
prod
 –
−
p ])-k(αG
−
p +[ pG
prod
 –
−
p ])-θB                                          (54) 
 
 
                                                 
20 See MARTIN (1993). 
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To compare the expressions found under (52), (53) and (54), I will substitute (53) from (52) 
and (54) from (52). By doing so, I intend to find out if one of the scenarios is stirring more 
competitive pressure on the firm’s profit function. This is the case when  producer prices 
decrease close to the marginal costs of production and the profit function is steepest. 
 
Substituting (53) from (52), yields: 
                                                                                       _      _                               _      _ 
                  CP1 –  CP2    =   b(p - pB)(α -1) – k(p - pG)(α +1)     <   0                                    (55) 
 
Substituting (54) from (52), yields: 
                                                                                              _                            _ 
                  CP1 –  CP3      =   b(α – αB)p – k(α - αG)p    <  0                                                  (56) 
 
Both expressions, (55) and (56) show that the effect when differentiating the policy 
instrument with respect to 
−
p  or with respect to α, dominate the competitive pressure found 
under common price caps and common co-payments in the benchmark scenario. Both profit 
functions for firm B are steeper than firm B’s profit function under the benchmark scenario. 
 
Now, to find out which profit function is steepest (differentiated price caps or differentiated 
co-payments), I substitute (56) from (55), which yields: 
                                                                            _                                                          _ 
CP2  –  CP3    =  b[pB(α–1) + 
−
p (αB–1)] – k[pG(α-1) + 
−
p (1- αG)]     <   0         (57) 
 
From the expression in (57), I find that the effect on competitive pressure from different co-
payments dominates the effect of different price caps. Competitive pressure seems highest 
under scenario three (differentiated co-payments). Firm B’s profit function is steepest under 
differentiated co-payments, meaning that it’s producer price is lowest and the profit function 
least profitable respectively. 
 
5.5 Concluding remarks 
Under the taken assumptions, in all three scenarios the equilibrium prices are found to be 
higher than the marginal costs of production, c. This is because consumers perceive the brand 
and the generic as being  differentiated goods. This also explains why p*G is lower than p*B in 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
46 
scenario one and two. Differentiated co-payments in scenario three allow firm G to exceed the 
producer price of firm B in the equilibrium.  
 
Generally, increasing the co-payment and thus increasing the patient’s cost burden may lead 
to a lower consumption since patients might substitute away from pharmaceutical products. 
By differentiating co-payment rates across brands and generics the overall demand for drugs 
might not change although the composition of the drug demand will. A relatively higher co-
payment rate for brands and a relatively lower co-payment rate for generics will reduce the 
consumption of brands and increase the consumption for generics.  
 
The lower the price cap, the stronger the downwards pressure on consumer prices. But the 
lower the maximum reimbursable amount, the more often and the higher the cost burden for 
the patient when firms do not set their prices according to the price cap. This can lead to a 
more limited choice of products because due to a more restricted ability to pay and 
willingness to pay on the demand side only products are chosen that do not exceed the price 
cap and thus avoid additional co-payments. For the supply side on the other hand an adaption 
to a relatively lower price cap would mean lower profit margins and decreases the incentive to 
invest in research and development of new innovative products. In the long run, this limits the 
future choice and supply of pharmaceutical products. Differential price caps can provide 
incentive for research intense firms by allowing a sufficiently high price cap and restricting 
low-cost generic products to a relatively lower price cap.  
 
No setting was able to reach prices equal to the firms marginal costs. This is because the 
goods are perceived as differentiated goods. Although different price caps as well as different 
rates of co-payment work in the same direction of creating more price sensitivity on the 
demand side, the results suggest that the effect of differentiated co-payments for generic 
medicines range over the current system of common price caps and common co-payments. 
Different co-payments offer a more flexible regulatory spectrum than modified price caps 
alone. In addition, competitive pressure seems to be highest under differentiated co-payments 
also and supports this argument. 
 
However, since economic theory predicts that differentiated products will result in prices that 
exceed marginal costs even in a Bertrand model and that these differences will increases as 
products become more differentiated, it might be wise for policy makers to invest in 
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consumer information systems when striving for pharmaceutical cost containment. Due to 
licensing, safety and other legal requisites, today’s generic pharmaceuticals are perceived to 
be objectively from the same quality as their branded counterparts. But still, due to some 
quality believes on the demand side, both drugs might not be seen as equivalent and patients 
as well as prescribing physicians tend to be in favor for brand products. Therefore, 
influencing the consumers’ perceived value for the generic drug, θG, is another way of 
tackling the problem. A better informed consumer will have a θG closer to the perceived brand 
quality, ∆θ=θB-θG becomes very small or zero if the patient is indifferent between both goods. 
 
5.6 Limitations of the model 
Using a Bertrand price competition model, I have illustrated, that under certain assumptions, 
differentiated co-payments for branded and generic goods can lead to a more competitive 
market situation, rather than a common regulatory mean for both goods, once the patent for 
the active chemical ingredients has been expired. 
 
The model assumes that there exist two firms, where firm B produces the brand-name 
originator and firm G the generic competitor. We assume that the products are perfect 
substitutes to their chemical formula, but we consider that consumers perceive them as 
vertically differentiated. Furthermore, I assume that the marginal costs of production are 
similar for both firms and independent from the products quality. The latter assumption might 
be controversial since it could be argued that firms producing generic goods might have 
relatively higher marginal costs of production. Brand-name originator firms are often long 
established in a market and thus can use technologies of already existing products, especially 
when offering an own branded-generic simultaneously to the innovative originator. However, 
literature often assumes constant and similar marginal costs of production [see e.g. SCOTT-
MORTON 1998]. 
 
If we relax the previous assumptions, we could make the model more dynamic of course. For 
example we could introduce more firms into the market and not only observe firm B and G 
competing in prices. Firm G is no longer the only producer of a generic substitute, 
competition between more firms producing in this segment would be possible. In addition a 
scenario is possible where firm B can decide to not only produce the brand-name originator, 
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but simulataneously offer a so called brand-named generic to compete and possible try to 
drive firm G out of the market. 
 
Furthermore, the model assumes linear demand and supply functions. Linear functions are 
also often used in literature because they are convenient and easy to derivate. A non-linear 
demand function could offer a more complex scenario.  
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6 Summary and conclusion 
This thesis intended to give an overview of off-patent pharmaceutical pricing in dependence 
of the governmental regulations. It shows that the process of pharmaceutical price setting in 
this segment can be influenced by multiple determinants. Price competition can be observed 
in spite of insurance coverage. The degree of competition varies according to the product’s 
life-cycle. During patent protection for an active chemical ingredient for example, 
competition can already be observed between products with similar therapeutic health effects. 
With patent expiry the degree of competition increases. From now on, generic copies of the 
beforehand legally protected chemical formulation be launched in the market. Paradoxically, 
the price of the originator does not necessarily decrease with generic competition. This 
phenomenon is for example been reasoned with the segmentation of the demand into a price 
sensitive and a less price sensitive side. Between the generic versions of an active chemical 
ingredient often exists a relatively grown competition. The price of a generic product 
generally decreases with the number of generic copies. 
 
Since the ability to finance the social insurance system is wished for in most western 
countries, governments and other third-party payers aim to cost contain the expenditures for 
pharmaceutical products. Due to this, states engage with multiple policy instruments into 
pharmaceutical pricing. The regulation with reference pricing seems to be the most popular 
policy instrument. Price caps are more strict in their implementation. Theoretically 
pharmaceutical manufacturers are free in their product pricing. As the reference price, the pre-
defined price cap only sets the maximum reimbursable amount. If the actual price exceeds the 
maximum reimbursable amount, the patient has to bear this difference completely alone. 
Many firms will now lower their prices to the price cap when the initial price was set higher 
to avoid a decrease in their sales volume. The difference to the reference price system which 
aims to control costs by stimulating competition,  is that a price cap system is much tighter in 
setting the maximum reimbursable amount. This may help to contain costs but has the risk to 
drive out competition if set too low. The goal of price regulatory interventions is to control 
pharmaceutical pricing and to increase competition. To which degree these regulatory means 
succeed strongly depends on the design of the regulatory system. A reference price system 
depends on the clustering of products and a price cap system is strongly determined by the 
level of the capped price. Below the maximum reimbursable price, competition is limited 
though. These supply side policies are complemented by patient’s co-payments on the 
demand side. Other demand side policies are positive lists that try to regulate the physicians 
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prescribing practice. Trading off the effects of demand side policies against the effect of 
supply side policies, it seems that increasing the cost-awareness among patients and 
physicians is more sufficient then tight supply sight policies in total. In terms of regulations, 
the state has to consider that in cases where he sets prices for new innovative medicines under 
a too strong negative price pressure, the incentive for manufacturers to invest in the research 
of diseases and the development of new drugs is reduced.  
 
Since 1993 the Norwegian government regulates pharmaceutical prices. It implemented 
reference pricing to control costs. Other regulations such as patients’ co-payments followed 
and underlined different developments later on. Furthermore, the state tried with generic 
substitution to give further financial incentives to the dispensing pharmacy. These regulations 
underly a dynamic process of permanent changes. In 2005, a modification of the Norwegian 
reimbursement scheme came to work. These changing regulations mean constantly new 
orientations for patients and physicians.  
 
The research issue of this thesis was to analyze the effects on producer prices on drugs from 
introducing differentiated price caps and differentiated patient co-payment rates. To do so, it 
reviewed key studies and introduced a theoretical model into the discussion where price 
competition à la Bertrand was applied to the Norwegian market for off-patent medicines. 
Under certain assumptions, differentiated co-payments for branded and generic goods led to a 
more competitive market situation than that was the case under a common co-payment for 
both goods. The current rate for co-payment are 36% in Norway, both for generics and 
brands.  Consumers’ perceived value for generics was observed to determine producer prices. 
Due to licensing, safety and other legal requisites, generic medicines are objectively from the 
same quality as their branded counterparts. But due to certain quality believes on the demand 
side, brand and generic might not be seen as equivalent and patients might tend to be in favor 
for brand products. Influencing the consumers’ perceived value for the generic drug is another 
way of tackling the problem with less regulatory involvement. Under perfect competition, 
consumer prices should be closest to the marginal costs of production.  
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